The Impact of Religious Belief in the
Theater of Operations
Lieutenant
Commander Paul R. Wrigley,
Chaplain Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve
(Naval War College Review,
Spring 1996, Vol. XLIX, No. 2)
Authorized by: Lori Almeida, Naval War College Press and Review,U.S.
Naval War College,686 Cushing Road,Newport, RI 02841, almeidal@usnwc.edu.
https://navycrow.com/can-religious-military/
I look upon the spiritual life of the
soldier as even more important than his equipment. . . . The soldier's heart,
the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul are everything. Unless the soldier's
soul sustains him, he cannot be relied upon and will fail himself and his
country in the end.
General
George C. Marshall
Chaplain Wrigley is currently assigned to the Chaplain Resource Board in Norfolk, Virginia. He graduated from the U.S. Naval
Academy in 1976 and earned his wings as a naval
aviator in 1978. He flew A-6s with Attack Squadron 85 and was an instructor in Training
Squadron 23. He left active duty in 1983 to attend Biblical Theological Seminary in Hatfield, Pennsylvania, reentering
active service in 1989 as a chaplain. He served thereafter aboard USS Home (CG 30) and as staff chaplain at Marine Corps Air Station,
Cherry Point, North Carolina.
He graduated with distinction from the Naval War College
in 1995.
WARS ARE NOT FOUGHT BY MACHINES; they are
fought by people, affected by the intense emotions
arising from combat. As Carl von Clausewitz
acknowledged: "Military
activity is never directed against material
force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces
which give it life, and the two cannot be separated." 2 For Clausewitz the term
"moral" referred to the "sphere of mind and spirit," intangible attributes, the principal being "courage." While Clausewitz was not concerned
specifically with the spiritual, religious belief is a moral force, one that should not be ignored
in the theater of operations.3
Antoine-Henri Jomini's
The Art of War, written with full awareness of earlier centuries of European
religious strife, included the "propagation,
crushing, or defending of religious theories" among "the reasons that states go to war": Jomini considered such wars "above all the most deplorable."4
This
article argues that although acknowledged by present doctrine, religious beliefs
are considerably more important to military operations
than is generally recognized.
For example, the joint directive
on staff estimates mentions religion only
briefly and obliquely: "Consider social
conditions, which run a wide range from
the psychological ability of the populace to withstand the rigors of war to health and
sanitation conditions in the
area of operations. Language,
social institutions and attitudes, and similar factors that may affect
selection of a [course of action]
must be considered."5
The commander's staff planners are
to "describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority
groups, population distribution,
health and sanitation, and other related factors." 6 The publication then discusses the effects of the sociological situation in terms only of broad enemy capabilities and options for
friendly forces; little guidance is given for
analyzing religion's impact on the theater of operations.
This outlook reflects the West's downplaying of-even to the point of disregarding-the
direct influence of religion on politics and war; it stems from a prevalent feeling that religion is a
private, not a public, matter. That view is not held in other parts of the world, and such myopia can lead to
misunderstanding. Religion and religious
belief are powerful forces that have existed since the dawn of man. They are not limited to any one
part of the world but touch the lives of men, women, and children
around the globe. For many, religion
is the true source of courage and strength.
It can inspire and mobilize
combatants and affect the outcome
on the battlefield. An operational commander, however
well trained in the military issues, who is
ignorant of or discounts the importance of religious belief can strengthen his enemy, offend his allies, alienate his own
forces, and antagonize public opinion. Religious
belief is a factor he must consider in evaluating the enemy's intentions and capabilities, the state of his own
forces, his relationships with allies, and his
courses of action.
While religion is difficult to define, one general approach calls it
"the acknowledgment of a higher,
unseen power; an attitude of reverent dependence on that power in the conduct of life; and special actions,
e.g., rites, prayers, and acts of mercy,
as peculiar expressions and means of cultivation of the religious attitude."7 On the grand
scale, religion has the power to change the very fabric of society. It can shape the personal,
political, economic, and
cultural foundations of a people.
The Christianization of the West and the rise of Islam are two
examples of religious movements that wrought
tremendous change in the world and continue to have a profound impact upon it. On the personal level,
religion can alter individual lives. It has
brought comfort and peace of mind to
millions of men and women, providing
a sense of meaning and worth, and
offering the key to under standing
oneself and one's existence.
Religious faith has enabled people
to endure, even triumph over, personal hardship
and tragedy.
Religion, Fundamentalism, and
Nationalism
Precisely because religion is intensely personal, it
can be a destabilizing social factor,
especially when attempts are perceived to trivialize, control, or destroy it.
It can mobilize some of the deepest
passions in humanity; many people
have been willing to die for their
faith. Wars have been fought and atrocities committed in the name of religion. "Religion, in short, matters
to people; it is real, and so is its influence on human personality. For some it is more
real than the state . . . [It] is more real,
more alive, more vital than the good opinion of others.
The
essence of religious martyrdom is the sacrifice
that comes from the refusal to yield
to what one's society demands. Anyone
who believes deeply is a potential martyr, for belief always entails a bedrock principle
that will not yield."
Not surprisingly, then,
many sources of conflict, even apparently
secular nationalism, involve deep
religious issues. Is the threat ultimately a religious movement (as
exemplified by radical Islamic fundamentalism) or an ethnic demand for a
separate government and flag?
Fundamentalism and nationalism are
often in a symbiotic relationship, too closely intertwined to be distinguishable.
One analyst
observes that "nationalism and fundamentalism are not separate problems. They are essentially identical.
If their rhetoric differs, their causal impulses do not. Their psychological appeal to the masses is identical. Nationalism is simply secular
fundamentalism. To the extent they
differ at all, religious
fundamentalism may even become the preferable disease from the US standpoint. In any case, these are twin enemies.
And we are going to have to struggle with them, on many fields, for a very long time to come." 9
Certainly, from the commander's
viewpoint, nationalism and fundamentalism do
share many elements Deciding which is which, and accordingly who is likely
to do what, is frequently complicated thereby. In any case, nationalists
and fundamentalists can be difficult
to deal with, whether as enemies or allies. They are often hostile toward cultural
change and view other peoples-particularly those of the West- with suspicion. They consider their ideas the only
important ones; other opinions do not
really count. Their actions may seem irrational, and their views on human rights,
especially concerning the treatment of prisoners and
civilians, may differ drastically from those of Western military commanders. Atrocities
such as massacres can "occur because
powerful ideological forces-be they fascism, nationalism, or religious fundamentalism--can produce
deep seated hatred between states."11
Clearly the commander's task will not be easy; the
world remains a dangerous place, even with the end of the Cold War. Commanders will face both combat
and military operations other than
war, and religion can play a critical role in
either. What aspects of
religious belief, then, should the commander consider in planning for theater operations?
In preparing his estimate of the
situation, the commander is to "determine and analyze those factors that will influence the
choice of a [course of action] as well as those that affect the capabilities of the
enemy." 12
Several general areas of concern about this topic should be examined:
religions present in the region, clergy, religious belief, modes of worship, the
role of religion in the motivation of indigenous people, its effect on transcultural
communication and that of socioeconomic
factors on religion, relations of religious communities with government, and the influence of religious
schools.
Planners should also note principal faith symbols and the significance of sacred shines, temples, and holy
places.13
In general, commanders need to examine the religious
factors involved on all sides and predict
how they might influence the enemy, allies (and thus the coalition),
their own troops, and public opinion at home and around the world. Reactions
among any of these to decisions related to religious belief can
seriously impede operations in the
theater; a commander sensitive to the issue can at least minimize if not preclude problems.
Effects upon the Enemy.
Among the issues that should be
examined is the relationship between
religious leaders and the government of the adversary state. Is the government secular or dominated
by clerics? If the latter,
are they fundamentalists?
If secular, are there strong
religious forces at work within the country? If so, what is the political
manifestation? (For instance, in several nations Muslims are at odds with their governments, seeing themselves
as true believers and considering it "blasphemous and unnatural" to be ruled by " misbelievers." 14 Also, Islamic fundamentalism in general
offers "unswerving opposition to the West" and rejects "any Western influence or presence in the lands of
Islam." 15 Are there sacred shrines, temples, or holy places, the damaging of which could be portrayed as desecration and would increase the resistance of the
enemy? How might the enemy use religion as a propaganda tool to inspire his own forces or to erode his
opponent's will to fight?
Effects upon
Allies.
The
commander also needs to consider how religion affects relationships with his
allies. He should be sensitive to religious issues that might offend his allies or be used as propaganda by the enemy. Joint doctrine recognizes that "each partner
in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity-the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor
differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact.
Commanders should strive
to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important
to allies and coalition members, consistent with the
situation."16
Even minor differences can have great impact. For example, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in April 1991 the United States air-dropped military "Meals Ready to Eat" containing pork to starving Kurdish Muslims, who complained about being given food that violated their religious dietary restrictions.17
There can be more serious
repercussions; for instance, as Israel learned the hard way, potential allies can be turned into enemies. During
the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, in a
remarkable event,welcomed Israeli soldiers and
tossed flowers to them. The Shiites praised the Israelis "for their deliverance"
from the Palestine Liberation Organization.
But perceived Israeli arrogance soon turned the liberation into "smiling Shiites" what seemed an occupation. "No other facet of Israel's gross misadventure in Lebanon," notes one commentator, "presents a clearer case of bad judgment and self-defeating policy than Israel's mishandling of the Shiite population of south Lebanon that turned a confederate against the Palestinians into a formidable adversary of the State of lsrael."18 In the event, many Shiites turned to Iran, Islamic fundamentalism, and Hezbollah, the Party of God.
Effects upon Own Forces.
The commander also needs to be concerned with the impact of religious belief upon his own
forces. He is responsible for the religious, spiritual,
moral, and ethical well-being of those within his command. As soldiers approach
combat, their anxiety over their
safety and their interest
in spiritual matters
increase. The commander who develops a strong plan for combat religious
ministry will increase the morale and
combat effectiveness of his unit. Captain Kevin Smith notes that "a unit's
true fighting power is a constantly changing combination of both psychological/moral force...and the purely
mathematical possibilities of weapons
effects." The concept of
maneuver--the central element of
modern, joint U.S. combat doctrine
seeks to create disruption not so much by what is happening at the moment as by causing
mental apprehension, doubt, and fear as to what might come next.
"Moral force," as Smith uses the term, is usually understood as "the courage, daring, and combativeness of a body of troops" and is often presumed in the West to have nothing to das Smith uses the term, is usually understood as "the courage, daring, and combativeness of a body of troops" and is often presumed in the West to have nothing to do with religious or ethical standards .20
But religious belief can have a tremendous impact upon it. Spiritual
resources can provide strength, inner
peace, security, and a sense of tranquility to the soldier, thereby increasing the moral force of the unit. Here
a chaplain is invaluable; he provides the
spiritual resources that enable soldiers to strengthen their faith and thus the moral courage crucial for survival in
combat. One battalion commander has said, "Combat veterans know full well the
positive influence a chaplain has on unit morale, and few at any level would go into combat again without
one."21
Effect upon Public Opinion.
Finally, interest in spiritual matters also increases domestically as friends and family membe rFs in the military face potential combat. The public is concerned about anything that threatens loved ones. The commander must be sensitive to any decisions that will be perceived as inhibiting the fundamental right to worship or violating religious codes or freedoms. Such actions can arouse public opinion and erode support.
Religion, then, is a
powerful force that touches the lives of countless people throughout the world. It is intensely
personal and can mobilize its adherents to endure
great hardship for the sake of a divine goal. Religion's role in the theater of operations is often underestimated,
because of underestimation of religion's influence
on politics and war, and it is hard to quantify, due to varying individual cultural backgrounds. Wise operational
commanders will attempt to identify its impact upon their enemies, their allies, their own forces,
and the public.
The importance of religion to fundamental aspects of military
operations is fresh in mind from
recent experience. A number of episodes from American military history also demonstrate why commanders should
incorporate religious factors into
their planning. Let us examine four disparate U.S. military operations in this light.
Desert Shield and Storm
Of all the matters that
concerned General Norman Schwarzkopf leading up to and during the Gulf war, "the touchiest
issues almost always involved religion."22 They affected "everything
from building the international political coalition to the role of the Israelis to
individual religious practices,"23
Religion was a topic of debate in
tl.ie theater of operations, across the United States, and throughout
the world. In Saudi Arabia, as will
be discussed, restrictions on public worship and the "chaplain" issues became media events.
Iraqi Manipulation.
Saddam Hussein tried to use religion to fracture the coalition by driving a wedge between its Islamic members and the
others. A radio station
in Yemen, which
was sympathetic to Baghdad, broadcast
an 
interview with a man who deplored the "defilement" of the Muslim holy cities; he
claimed that a U.S. tank had damaged his car in Mecca and that an
American military checkpoint controlled access to the holy sites.24
Saddam Hussein attempted to gain a military edge by
using religion to rally the Iraqi people. Hussein declared that "in
a war there will be many losses. God is on our side. That is why we will
beat the aggressor."26 Conversely,
he also took advantage of the coalition's care not to damage mosques,
holy places, archaeological sites, and the like, by stationing combat assets near them.27
Interactions with Saudi Arabia.
The conduct of non-Islamic worship in Saudi Arabia was a difficult issue for the coalition. Under the Koran, Islamic law prohibits any faith group other than Muslim from practicing its religion in that nation. There was, therefore, concern about the reaction of Islamic fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia. One prominent theologian who opposed the U.S. presence declared that the "practice of foreign faiths on our sacred soil gives offense to Islam. The transgressions of Saddam are merely the excuse America is using to spread the disease of imperialism." 28 The Saudis were so anxious in this respect that King Fahd even brought in Islamic scholars to "verify the sanctity of the mosques." 29
The presence of
Jewish service members and chaplains was
a particularly sensitive
matter. An article about the celebration of Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish new year, in Saudi Arabia caused Prince Khalid to complain to General Schwarzkopf, "You have brought
a rabbi into this country who is saying that
for the first time in history, the ram's horn will be blown on Islamic
soil" 30
Schwarzkopf summoned the newly arrived
Central Command (CentCom)
chaplain, Colonel David Peterson, and told him, "You have the King on the ceiling!
There are three things that can cause this whole coalition effort to come unraveled
and you have one of them! Now you get out
there and you keep your chaplains
under control. And you make sure that all my troops have the opportunity to practice their faith."31
Therein was the dilemma: the coalition needed to
provide for the religious expression
of U.S. forces without offending the Saudis. A number of controversial policies
were implemented in an attempt
to deal with the problem.
General Schwarzkopf called together
his chaplains to provide them guidance. Those in the cities were "to take
the Christian or Jewish insignia off your uniforms, or to wear them in such a way that they can't be
seen." (Chaplains in the field would
not be affected by that requirement.)
He was also concerned about
religious services: "We won't
advertise them, publicize them, or let them be filmed-we don't want them broadcast on TV for the whole Moslem world to
see."
General Schwarzkopf expected resistance from the chaplains, especially
on the issue of insignia, and was
surprised therefore when the chaplains "readily
agreed, and even went a step further:
they started calling themselves 'morale officers."' (The Air Force had used the term "morale
officer" to refer to its chaplains in Saudi Arabia even before Desert
Shield. The U.S. European Command
had also adopted it. From there, "morale officer" found its way
into the Cent Com policy.) 32 These guidelines were codified in a directive promulgated on 12 September
1990.
That
directive placed restrictions on the display of faith-specific religious symbols (including flags and pennants),
use of religious articles, distribution of religious
materials, media coverage of religious services, and accessibility to chaplains
by the media. Worship services were to be called "fellowship groups" and
were not to be conducted "in open areas or in the view of Host
Nationals." Information concerning these services was to be
"disseminated verbally or through
intra-unit correspondence ...
to prevent inviting
unwanted attention to religious services." 33
However well intended, many of these strictures had a negative effect upon the American forces and public
opinion in the United States.34
There were, on the other hand, examples of cooperation between
U.S. forces and the Saudis. The CentCom chaplain, on his own initiative, met regularly with
the Saudi Arabian Anny's Religious Affairs Department. He explained
how chaplains and their assistants provided religious support to U.S. soldiers.
Chaplain Peterson made arrangements for American Muslim
soldiers to worship in local mosques and to participate in an Umran, a pilgrimage to Mecca. The Saudis understood the American desire to worship; they just wanted it
done discreetly. Religion was also a factor in planning the
offensive against Iraqi forces.
In late October 1990, coalition military leaders discussed timing, and General Schwarzkopf was told "that the window of opportunity for an attack would slam shut in March, when Ramadan, the Moslem holy month, began"; the coalition would need to define its goals quickly and begin its offensive soon. 35 Fasting during the month of Ramadan is one of the five pillars of the Muslim faith, andits importance to Islamic allies could not be ignored.
During the ground offensive, an unexpected challenge
arose when large numbers
of Iraqis were captured. Between 5 and 20 percent of the Iraqi enemy prisoners
of war (EPWs) claimed to be Christian.
Numerous Iraqi EPWs requested
the opportunity to see Christian chaplains; special tents were set up for Iraqi
Christians to worship, and Arabic New Testaments were provided. The Saudis
were reluctant and unprepared to provide religious support for EPWs until the CentCom chaplain reminded them
of Geneva Convention requirements to do so.36
Impact upon U.S. Forces.
Despite
the claims in his autobiography, General Schwarzkopf was
not entirely successful in his policy of restricting the display of
symbols and calling chaplains "morale officers"--it had a
negative impact and caused
resentment within Central Command.37
The New York Times reported that "the
rules have disturbed some American soldiers and sailors, who say they resent that any prohibitions have been put
on their religious freedom, Especially in a country that they are now being asked to
defend with their lives."38 One soldier said, 'Tm not
a troublemaker, and I don't want to offend Moslems or anyone else. It
just seems wrong to me that Americans who have come to defend the Arabs should be asked to sacrifice our traditions and beliefs."39
The issues were hotly debated in the theater of operations and in the United States. The senior Marine chaplain present voiced his frustration to the Cent Com chaplain: "I was not sent here to be a Protestant-Morale Officer. My denomination did not educate me to be a P-Morale Officer. And the Chaplain Corps didn't ordain me to be a P-Morale Officer. And I was not sent over here to be the senior Marine P-Morale chaplain in country. I am who I am and these Marines are who they are and they've been sent here and they're going to die, perhaps, in this country to defend it to give them the right to be who they are. And I think we should have the right if we're going to die, to die as who we are, Chaplain." 40
The CentCom chaplain affirmed these misgivings. "Taking off branch insignia and
referring to a chaplain as a 'Morale
Officer' had a negative impact on the morale of service members, the
American public and the Chaplains. In addition,
it raised serious questions regarding U.S. Public Law." 41 There were further
problems, as he was to observe later,
with respect to "constitutional issues, the insignia being
our way of identifying ourselves
to our parishioners, and personal conviction."
42 The directive to call chaplains
"morale officers" was officially revoked on 1 January 1991.
No chaplain had been assigned to the CentCom staff during the opening stages of Desert Shield, and until Colonel Peterson arrived the lack of a chaplain contributed greatly to confusion in religious policies for U.S. forces. Initially "some service members were not allowed to bring Bibles and religious symbols, [and] some were required to change their religious preference on 'dog-tags."' Contradictory directives were published, some in violation of church law of various denominations, and erroneous information was disseminated. 43 The results included negative media coverage and dissatisfaction among the troops and leaders of faith groups. The media reported, "It is not even clear whether there is a policy. Rumors and confusion abound on the subject. Some officers say the Pentagon has issued a flat order barring the open practice of religion. Others insist there is no such edict, only a general advisory that Saudi 'sensitivities' should be respected." 44
Despite such initial problems, the ministry to U.S.
forces throve. Many sought and found
the comfort that faith brings in the face of death. Attendance increased dramatically
at worship services, Bible studies, prayer meetings, prayer breakfasts, and fellowship groups. Many were
baptized, rededicated their lives to God, or
became more active in their faith.
American Public Opinion.
Letters from soldiers and media
reports had wide influence. During
Desert Shield, especially during the holidays in November and December, much was
written about religious issues. Though media representatives were not allowed
to talk to chaplains or cover worship services, many service members expressed their concern over the religious
restrictions, and the media reported
this to the American public. An editorial in the Washington Post commented
on the "insignia" and
"morale officer" issues and
the restrictions on worship. It concluded, "All this bears careful watching. Saudi
Arabia has its own culture, standards and strongly held religious beliefs,
and it stands in a special place in the Moslem world. The United
States does not seek to challenge any of
this but must insist that Americans in the military be protected in the full exercise of their religions.
That constitutional right travels with the troops
and must be respected
wherever they serve." 45
The possibility existed that public support for Desert
Shield and Storm might have eroded due to restrictions on worship and
related resentment toward the Saudi government. The U.S. military
had a difficult task explaining the policy and convincing the American
public that its troops were still able to worship.
War with Mexico
An early example in American history of religious belief affecting the theater of operations was the war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848. This conflict had religious implications for both the United States and Mexico. American troops initially entered Mexico without any chaplains assigned to tactical units, even though "the war was seen by many as a crusade by Protestant America to subdue Catholic Mexico." 46 This worked to the Americans' disadvantage when the Mexican press, both secular and religious, tried to manipulate the religious sensitivities of both sides to degrade the effectiveness of the U.S. Army.
Mexican propaganda portrayed the clash as a religious war, with the American objective being to "confiscate church property and destroy Catholicism." 47 Herman A. Norton notes the Mexican purpose for the distortions: "First, to incite Mexicans to resist the American military as a matter of religious duty; and second, to disturb or upset Catholic soldiers in the American Army, even to the point of considering desertion.”48
This propaganda alarmed President
James K. Polk and his advisors, who recognized
the danger in this conflict being portrayed as a religious war. They were concerned not only about the effect
upon the Mexican population but also about how Catholics, who constituted one-fourth of the regular
soldiers in the U.S. Army, would react.
Polk, upon the advice of his secretary of state James Buchanan,
decided to send two Catholic priests as chaplains to General Zachary Taylor's army. He reasoned that the
appointment of the two priests would allay the
fears of Catholic soldiers and civilians, while showing that "the government possessed no anti-Catholic bias and had no intention of
destroying churches and warring on religion in
Mexico."49 No Protestant chaplains were
appointed to the Anny, in order to emphasize that this was not a "Protestant crusade."
After receiving Anny commissions,
Fathers John McElroy and Anthony Rey joined General
Taylor near Matamoras, Mexico, on 6 July 1846. McElroy
remained at the base hospital while Rey was assigned to the combat
troops. In addition to his duties
ministering to the sick and wounded, McElroy organized a school for the local Mexican children and taught there four
hours a day. When Mass was offered to the American
soldiers, McElroy also served Mexican civilians. He hoped that his actions would help counter
Mexican propaganda about Americans.
Rey, meanwhile, served with
distinction during the siege of Monterrey in
September 1846 with his ministry to the wounded. Reports of his efforts even found their way into the American press,
when letters home from soldiers at the front
were published. In January 1847, Chaplain Rey and a companion were assassinated by Mexican guerrillas as they
travelled to Matamoras.
News of his death shocked the local village; most of its inhabitants went
out to recover the remains and bury them in
the local cemetery.
In February 1847, Congress
authorized the appointment of additional chaplains
to Anny tactical units in Mexico. This was due in part to the "impressive reports and letters sent by officers and soldiers commending the valuable service" of McElroy and Rey.50
Vietnam
The Vietnam War is a more recent
example of a conflict in which religious belief affected all the combatants. The Vietnamese culture
was radically un familiar to most Americans. The Vietnamese do not distinguish between the "secular and sacred,"
as many Westerners tend to do; a Vietnamese life is affected
much more by religion than is the typical American's.
Robert L. Mole comments about the Vietnamese culture: ''Just as life is composed of interwoven facts, just so do religious belief systems undergird
and control their daily life to an amazing degree.
Thus many Vietnamese unconsciously and culturally blend elements of Taoism,
Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism,
Islam, and Christianity with animism into a way of life. The monistic
Westerner reacts by rejecting philosophies that do not fit into his
'frame of reference' through a determination
that if one concept is correct, the others must be wrong. The pluralistic Vietnamese adopt, adapt, and utilize acceptable elements within
all the contrasting philosophical concepts
without apparently or consciously sensing
any inconsistency. This
fundamental difference of viewpoints must
be understood and appreciated if
citizens of the two cultures are to build lasting friendship and effective
rapport." 51
Further complicating matters was the ethnic mix of the
South Vietnamese people. The ethnic Vietnamese dwelt in the lowlands,
the plains in the valleys and the
river deltas. The second major ethnic group lived in the mountains and highlands.
Known as Montagnards, the group consisted of thirty-three tribes,
each with distinct variations
in "customs, mores, and religious beliefs which make it different from its neighbors." 52 The Montagnards made up only a small percentage of Vietnam's total population,
but they were of strategic importance because
they were the "primary
inhabitants of about 50 percent of Vietnam's land area." 53
This cultural and religious diversity
posed an immense challenge to
all combatants as they struggled to accomplish their military objectives.
The sensitive issue of religion was difficult for the
communist forces in the South,
because their reputation for anticlericalism stood in opposition to their public support of religious freedom. The National Liberation Front (NLF} tried to in6ltrate, neutralize, or win over religious
groups. Although it had
some success, it was looked upon with
suspicion by many, such as the Ong Ba, an indigenous
peasant religion.
Similarly, "Catholic memories of conflict
with the [Communist) Party were too powerful to overcome." 54 The anticommunist attitude of the Hrey
tribe, a Montagnard ethnic group, was primarily
due to religious differences.
A May 1966 report traced this attitude "to
1954 when the communists attempted
to put a stop to buffalo sacrifices," which were a vital part
of the Hrey animist religion. The Hrey had so resented this episode that they attacked the communists with crossbows and spears.55
These difficulties did not prevent the communist forces from trying to use religious belief to their advantage. They studied the various religious beliefs in order to disrupt joint South Vietnamese-American efforts. The communists used the alliance ritual of the Cua, another Montagnard ethnic group, to discourage tribesmen from entering alliances against them. "While only a few Americans have been so 'adopted,' subversive agents have used the Cua adoption alliance to their good advantage. Since religious value systems and taboos in a spirit-con trolled environment are involved, Cua tribesmen feel it impossible to break their pledge and fight once these alliances have been formed." 56The communists also used used religious belief to wa ge psychological warfare against the local population. A U.S. Navy training manual explained, "Beliefs arising within Animism give rise to the demand that proper disposal of the dead be made to avoid creating a wandering spirit. It is the same religious concept that encourages the mutilation of corpses by the enemy. This has psychological impacts not fully appreciated by Americans." 57
Village elders would often be kidnapped and threatened with decapitation if family members did not conform to communist wishes. Their families feared that decapitation "would separate that ancestor's soul to wander aimlessly in the afterlife without ascending in the family order."
By the same token, the South Vietnamese government had trouble dealing with the religious diversity within its borders. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem turned against two religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, as he consolidated power and eventually proclaimed himself president of the new goBy the same token, the South Vietnamese government had trouble dealing with the religious diversity within its borders. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem turned against two religious sects, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, as he consolidated power and eventually proclaimed himself president of the new government. His regime and those that followed it lacked legitimacy because they were seen by the peasants as a continuation of French colonial rule. "South Vietnam's urban elite possessed the outward manifestations of a foreign culture and often professed an alien faith."59
The composition of the military
leadership mirrored this weakness
of the government. "Concerning South
Vietnamese leadership, there was a real difference between officers and men. The officers
were urban, spoke French, and were often Catholic. The soldiers were rural Buddhists." 60
Diem further alienated
much of the rural population through village relocation. In 1962 he launched the Strategic Hamlet Program, designed
to concentrate the rural population in villages protected
against the communist
forces. It was also hoped that
this would be an effective tool to
cut off the NLF from local support.
The program was resented by many peasants
who for religious
and economic reasons
did not want to leave their homes and land. The Ong Ba, like other groups, stressed "ancestor worship
and the veneration of grave sites, and removing the family from their ancestors
was therefore a blasphemous act.' 61 The downfall of Diem's government was caused, in part, by his
inability to handle protests of the
Buddhist community. On 8
May 1963, nine people were killed in a demonstration at Hue.
Buddhist monks then shocked the world by burning themselves in protest against the Diem government. On 21 August the government raided twelve Buddhist temples and arrested over 1,400 Buddhists. On 1 November, Diem was killed and his government overthrown, with tacit American approval. 62 Only theCatholic Vietnamese community mourned Diem's death.
The problems of religious diversity facing the South Vietnamese government confronted U.S. forces as well. South Vietnamese policy decisions, coupled with a "strange" culture, proved difficult obstacles for the American military. This was highlighted in March 1965 during a Marine Corps training exercise, Operation SILVER LANCE. This evolution simulated problems that could arise when military members were not aware of the religious and value systems a foreign society embraced. "This exercise demonstrated that such a lack of information can create alienation of local peoples, a decrease in security, and a potential increase in casualties."63 The arrival of Marine combat units in March 1965 also emphasized a need for a more comprehensive indoctrination program. "It became readily apparent that an extensive program of lectures and discussions on the influence of Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and other indigenousvernment. His regime and those that followed it lacked legitimacy because they were seen by the peasants as a continuation of French colonial rule. "South Vietnam's urban elite possessed the outward manifestations of a foreign culture and often professed an alien faith."59
The composition of the military leadershipmirrored this weakness of the government. "Concerning South Vietnamese leadership, there was a real difference between officers and men. The officers were urban, spoke French, and were often Catholic. The soldiers were rural Buddhists." 60
Diem further alienated
much of the rural population through village relocation. In 1962 he launched the Strategic Hamlet Program, designed
to concentrate the rural population in villages protected
against the communist
forces. It was also hoped that
this would be an effective tool to
cut off the NLF from local support.
The program was resented by many peasants
who for religious
and economic reasons
did not want to leave their homes and land. The Ong Ba, like other groups, stressed "ancestor worship
and the veneration of grave sites, and removing the family from their ancestors
was therefore a blasphemous act.' 61 The downfall of Diem's government was caused, in part, by his
inability to handle protests of the
Buddhist community. On 8
May 1963, nine people were killed in a demonstration at Hue.
Buddhist monks then shocked the world by burning themselves in protest against the Diem government. On 21 August the government raided twelve Buddhist temples and arrested over 1,400 Buddhists. On 1 November, Diem was killed and his government overthrown, with tacit American approval. 62 Only the Catholic Vietnamese community mourned Diem's death.
The problems of religious diversity facing the South Vietnamese
government confronted U.S. forces as well. South Vietnamese policy decisions, coupled
with a "strange" culture,
proved difficult obstacles
for the American military. This was highlighted in March 1965 during a Marine Corps
training exercise, Operation SILVER LANCE. This evolution simulated
problems that could arise when military
members were not aware of the religious and value
systems a foreign society embraced.
"This exercise demonstrated that such a lack of information can create
alienation of local peoples, a decrease in security, and a potential
increase in casualties."63
The arrival of Marine combat units in March 1965 also emphasized a need for a more comprehensive indoctrination program.
"It became readily apparent that an extensive program
of lectures and discussions on the influence of Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and other indigenous religions
on the life of the people was necessary."64
As a result of SILVER LANCE, the Southeast Asia Religious Project
was established, in which a
Navy chaplain was directed to study
beliefs, customs, and religious practices. Chaplain Robert L. Mole was assigned from
August 1965 to July 1966 to collect
and prepare "materials
suitable for use in orienting
Navy and Marine Corps
personnel in Vietnam." 65
The fruit of this research was to be shared with the other services as well.
Much of what was learned was
relayed to American service members. New arrivals
to Marine Amphibious Force received two lectures, "Religions of Vietnam" and "Religiously Based
Customs of Vietnam." Numerous publications about
Vietnamese religions and culture were
printed.
Americans were told not to remove "spirit poles," which, "like the desecration of graves and molestation of spirit houses, can create potentially dangerous antagonism among those whomight otherwise be our friends. 66
Americans were also reminded that their own culture was as strange to the Vietnamese as theirs was to the Americans: "Remember That Cultural Differences May Bewilder Both Vietnamese And Americans. . . American culture is often perceived as active, material, and logical, while that of the Vietnamese is primarily passive, spiritual, and mystical."67 How effective the services were in teaching their people about Vietnamese culture is open to debate. Bergerud notes that "for reasons not at all apparent in retrospect, the army did almost nothing to prepare soldiers for the 'culture shock' (and the term is a good one) that all of them encountered when coming to Vietnam. Almost all of the veterans... stressed how totally ignorant they were about the Vietnamese and their culture.
They were also unprepared for the poverty of
Vietnam. Initial reactions were usually a mixture of curiosity and disgust."68
New arrivals were indoctrinated on Vietnamese
culture. For whatever reason,
this indoctrination seems to
have been ineffective. The lessons of SILVER LANCE were confirmed: American
ignorance or indifference did indeed alienate the Vietnamese, decrease security, and increase casualties.
Military Operations Other Than War
U.S. military
commanders must concern themselves today with operations not principally involving
combat. Many will prominently feature
religious practices and
requirements. As an illustration of
such concerns, let us examine a recent case of
considerable duration and media interest.
Operation GTMO
was the American response to the large number of refugees fleeing Haiti, in which refugees
were placed in camps at the U.S. naval station
at Guantanamo Bay (known for decades to servicemen as "GTMO," or "Gitmo"),
Cuba. Chaplains played a vital role. The Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander, Brigadier General Kenneth W.
Simpson, U.S. Army, was convinced that chaplains and their assistants
were integral to the mission. He asked for additional
chaplains and assistants
to support the 12,500 Haitians
and 1,500 U.S. military
and civilian personnel.69 He considered them important because
of "the significance of the spiritual dimension of the Haitian culture." 70
Chaplains proved crucial in providing support to the Haitians. They con ducted a minimum of two worship services and one Bible study per day, per camp. Worship services tended to be long and well attended, providing a constructive outlet for people of faith with little else to do. Chaplains also performed a number of other functions in the camps: they facilitated communications; clarified rumors; explained American civilian control and processing procedures; distributed clothing, Bibles, and religious literature; assisted in reuniting families; taught English as a second language; and counselled.
Chaplains also served as liaisons between the refugees and U.S. military and civilian officials. In general, because of their own experience, Haitians feared the military; but they considered the chaplains, as clergymen, trustworthy. The JTF Command Chaplain reported to General Simpson that "chaplains continue to have a significant impact on the character of the migrant camps. Many sources reported that on several occasions chaplains have facilitated two-way communications during demonstrations, helped defuse tense situations and assisted in restoring calm during disturbances.
Their role as religious leaders gives them credibility and status with the Haitian migrant community. They are viewed as reliable, objective sources of information and as peacemakers."71 The role of chaplains as peacemakers was an important one.
The JTF Command
Chaplain reported later that "due to continued disruptions and rock throwing incidents in some camps, the [Armed Forces] Commander has asked for additional chaplain support and presence in the
camps." 72
Chaplains also attended "town meetings" to listen to the refugees'
concerns.
Chaplains were placed on Coast Guard cutters, where they did
"double duty." They
accompanied the Haitians who were being repatriated to Port-au-Prince, counseling the refugees facing this
disappointing and difficult transition. The chaplains
also provided a ministry to the crews of the cutters. The JTF Command Chaplain noted that "the JTF Chaplain
and Coast Guard Chaplain (Commander) Bob
Adair met with cutter captains and
staff to coordinate religious coverage. Their
concern was not only chaplains assisting the management of migrants but expanded to include concerns for the
welfare of their crews. Perhaps due to the stress
and lengthy tours of duty there has recently been more than one suicide attempted."73
Direct support to military
personnel was also an important part of the JTF chaplains' duties. A full chapel program and chaplain services
were provided to service members. Chaplains also helped military personnel deal with the stress of Operation
GTM0, gave Haitian
cultural instruction to new arrivals,
and "return/reunion" briefs to department personnel. The JTF
Chaplain also advised the commander
on morale trends, food problems,
potential points of tension, and what was working well in the camps.74
These
examples have been offered to elaborate and underscore the truth of the
opening words of a recent Joint Publication: "Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many people
and has a significant effect on the goals, objectives,
and structure of society. In some cases, religious self-understanding may play a determinative or regulating role on policy,
strategy, or tactics. It is important for the joint force
commander (JFC) to have an understanding of the religious groups and movements within the theater and the
potential impact that they may have on the accomplishment of the assigned
mission." 75
Notes
1. George C. Marshall, quoted
in Donald W. Shea, "A
Ministry in the Eye of the Storm," Army, September 1991, p. 54.
2.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War ed.
and trans. Michael
Howard and Peter Paree (Princeton,
NJ.: Princeton Univ. Press,
1984), p. 137.
3.
Ibid.
4.
See Antoine-Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1977), chap. 1and art. 9, pp. 12, 31.
5.
U.S. Defense
Dept., Joint Operation Planning
and Execution System, Joint Pub 5-03.1 (Washington: Joint Staff, 4 August 1993), p. P-6-2.
6.
Ibid., p. P-3-4.
7.
Walter A. Ewell ed., Evangelical Dictionary of Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1984), p. 931.
8.
Stephen L. Carter, The Culture
of Disbelief (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 41- 2. (Emphasis original.)
9. Ralph Peters, "Vanity and the Bonfire
of the 'isms,"' Parameters,
Autumn 1993, pp. 40-1. Peters argues, for instance, that in
the Balkans the political and religious elements are almost inseparable.
(Emphasis original.)
10.For a detailed
discussion, see ibid., p. 43.
11.John J. Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New
World Order, eds. Graham Allison
and Gregory F. Treverton (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992),
p. 221.
12.Joint Operation Planning and Execution System:
Vol. 1, Planning Policies and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-
03.1 (Washington: Joint Staff, 4 August 1993), p. P-6-1.
13.U.S. Anny Dept., Religious Support
Doctrine, FM 16-1 (Washington: November
1989).
14.Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim
Rage," The
Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, p. 54.
15.David Wurmser,
"The Rise and Fall of the Arab World," Strategic Review,
Summer 1993, p. 35.
16.U.S. Defense
Dept., Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington: Joint
Staff, 1
February 1995), p. Vl-4. (Emphasis omitted.)
17.. Telephone
conversation with Capt E. F. Blancett, CHC, USN, U.S. European Command,
25
January 1995.
18. Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: Death of a Nation (New
York: Congdon and Weed, 1989), p. 204.
19. Kevin D. Smith, "Moral
Disruption by Maneuver." U.S. Army Aviation Digest, March/April
1990,
pp. 2-10.
20.Ibid., p. 3, footnote I.
21.Cole C. Kingseed
(Lt. Col., USA), "The Battalion
Chaplain," Infantry, July-August 1991, p.
16,
22.H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, /t Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam,
1993), p.388.
23.Shea, p. 54.
24.Susan Sachs, "A Christmas under Wraps: Troops Religious Rites Are Muffled to Nor
Offend Muslim Hosts," Newsday, 23 December 1990, p.
17.
25.Patrick J. Sloyan, " U.S. Troops Avoid Moslem Wrath; Saudis Fear Defiling of Holy Sites," Newsday, 4 October 1990, p. 13.
26."Hussein Vows to Miss Deadline," New' York Times, 22 December 1990, p. 7.
27, For coalition targeting policies, see U.S. Dept. of Defense,
Conduct of the Persian
Gulf War: Final
Report to Congress (Washington: 1992), pp. 132-3.
28.Colin Nickerson, "GIs in Desert Follow Faith in Furtive Way," The Boston Globe, 12 December
1990, p. 1.
29.Sloyan, p. 13.
30.Schwarzkopf, p. 388.
31.Telephone conversation with Chaplain David Peterson (Col., USA), Forces Command
Chaplain, Fort McPherson, Ga., J February
1995. Chaplain Peterson
served as CentCom
Chaplain
during Desert Shield and Storm.
32.Schwarzkopf, p. 389; Peterson, 3 February 1995.
33.USCINCCENT message, date-time group 121957Z September
1990, "Command Policy for the
Administration of Religious
Support Operation Desert Shield" [Unclassified).
34.Peterson, 3 February 1995; Editorial, "Religion and Desert Shield," Washington Post, 11 November
1990, p. A30; Philip Shenon, "Standoff in the Gulf: Out
of Saudi View, U.S. Force Allows
Religious Their Rites," New York Times,
22 December 1990, p. 1; and Nickerson, p. 1.
35.Schwarzkopf, p. 430.
36.Chaplain David Peterson (Col., USA), "After Action Report: Operation Desert Storm," briefing
to the Armed Forces Chaplain Board, Washington, D.C., summer 1991.
37.Schwarzkopf, p, 389.
38.Shenon, p. 1.
39.Nickerson, p. 1.
40.Oral history of Captain Tom Hien, CHC, USN, Chaplain
Resource Board, Norfolk, Va, 11
January
1995. "Marine chaplains" are in fact naval officers
of the Chaplain Corp, (CHC)
assigned to
Marine units.
41.Peterson, briefing.
42.Peterson, 3 February
1995; "Religion and Desert Shield"; Shenon, p. 1; and Nickerson, p. 1.
43.Peterson, briefing.
44.Nickerson, p. 1.
45."Religion and Desert Shield."
46.Herman A. Norton,
Struggling for Recognition: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1791-1865
(Washington: Office of the Chief of Chaplaincy, Dept. of
the Anny, 1977), pp. 64-5.
47.Ibid., p. 66.
48. Ibid.
49.Ibid.
50.Ibid.,
p. 73.
51.Robert L. Mole (Cdr., CHC, USN), "A Brief Survey of 1he Phat-Giao Hoa-Hao
of
Vietnam," Southeast
Asia Religiou1 Project, 1969, p. xii.
52.Robert L. Mole (Cdr., CHC, USN), Peoples
of Tribes of South Vietnam (Saigon:
COMNAVSUPPACT Saigon, Summer 1968), p. 7.
53.Ibid.
54.Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 52, 66.
55.[Robert L. Mole (Cdr., CHC, USN)], "The
Montagnardt (Tribes-People) of I Corps,
South Vietnam," Southeast Asia Religious Project, May 1966, p. I-18.
56.Mole, Peoples of Tribes of
South Vietnam, pp. 186-7.
57.U.S. Navy Dept., The Religion
of South Vietnam in Faith and
Fact, NAVPERS 15991 (Washington: Bureau
of Naval Personnel,
1967), p. 5.
58.Jim E. Fulbrook (Capt., MSC, USA), "LAMSON 719, Part I: Prelude to Air Assault," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, June 1986, p. 11.
59.Bergerud, p. 3
60.Richard O'Hare, quoted in Bergerud, p. 230.
61.Bergerud, p. 52.
62.Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 26- 7.
63.NAVPERS 15991, p. v.
64.Herbert L. Bergsma (Cdr., CHC, USN), Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962-1971 (Washington: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1985), p. 100.
65.Ibid., p. 101.
66.NAVPERS 15991, pp. 91- 7.
67.Ibid, p. 95.
68.Bergerud, p. 170.
69.U.S. Atlantic Fleet memorandum 1331 aerial N02C of 18 May
1992.
70.Ibid.
71.CJTF GTMO memorandum
serial JTF-CH ofl0June 1992.
72.CJTF GTMO memorandum serial JTF-CH of 17 June 1992.
73.Ibid.
74.U.S. Atlantic Fleet memorandum 1331 aerial N02C of 18 May 1992.
75.U.S. Dept. of Defense, Religious
Ministry Support for Joint Operations, Joint Pub I-OS {Washington: Joint Staff, 3 Augu1t 1993), p. 1-1.
Dr.Gerding´s special
acknowledgement: Meg Gers,Periodicals
Department,Enoch Pratt Free Library/State Library Resource Center
400 Cathedral Street,Baltimore, MD 21201.
Touching the lives of countless people throughout the world, religion can be both
intensely personal and notably political, its effects extending from individual motivation to national or group
goals, strategies, and decisions. While
the role of religion is difficult to quantify, the wise commander will carefully
study its effects on military
operations.
