Remembering the Destroyer ARA Bouchard (D-26) in 1982
Published in the Boletín del Centro Naval 861,
MAY/DEC 2023.
Captain (Ret) War Veteran Rafael Rey Álvarez
This is true history, chronological and detailed,
of the actions of the escort ships of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano,
destroyer ARA Bouchard (D-26) and ARA Piedrabuena (D-29), when they formed Task
Group 79.3 (GT 79.3) during and after the attack by the submarine HMS
Conqueror, on May 2, 1982.
There is some naval terminology, which I have tried to minimize for my friends and acquaintances who do not master those terms, in order to make the narration more friendly. However, it is not possible to make all the clarifications, as it would extend too much, in a text that is already very extensive in itself.
The sonars (used to detect submarines) worked
passively by order of naval superiority, which had established that the general
policy for using acoustic sensors should be passive (silent, just listen). The
ship sailed with the crew in war cruiser roles (50% at their stations, the rest
resting).
This condition was changed after having been ordered to abort the mission to attack the British Task Force around 0410 hours, given that the weather conditions, unforeseeably, prevented the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo from launching its attack aircraft,the A-4Q with the appropriate weapons configuration to inflict reasonable damage on the enemy. Previously and since midnight, 100% of the crew had occupied their combat positions, after having raised, under the circumstances, the War Flag on the mast, with the majority of the officers and crew members trained on decks and having sung the National Anthem.
A few minutes after 1600, a strong
detonation/concussion was felt on board on the port side and the ship listed to
starboard. Such was the magnitude that, finding myself resting since midday
after 9 hours of continuous guard on the bridge, the shock produced suddenly
woke me up from my deep sleep, without knowing what was happening. Immediately
the battle gong (alarm) sounded and I went to take my position on the bridge.
I was a Midshipman in my second year as an officer and senior officer on board; I served as Chief of Navigation of the Destroyer ARA Bouchard and my combat position was Commanding Officer of the Bridge Watch (OCG).
Upon reaching it, I could smell a strong smell of gunpowder in the air. The Commander W. Bárcena and the Chief of Operations, Navy Lieutenant A. Castrilli, were already on the bridge. With me came the 2nd Commander Lieutenant Commander R. Fontanarrosa, the Chief of Engineers Lieutenant Commander G. Gomez and the Chief of Communications Frigate Lieutenant E. Facchin.
I am not going to elaborate here on whether the
third torpedo launched from HMS Conqueror, which missed the C-4, hit the ship
without detonating, or in its vicinity, or due to a failure or a self-destruct
device. It is not the purpose of these lines. It is the subject of a technical
analysis and not a narrative and historical one, which is our purpose.
I will then proceed to continue my story, but first it is necessary to clarify certain reckless and false versions, which once circulated and still do, that the Destroyers abandoned the Cruiser:
a. It is
obvious to any naval officer that no ship that is part of a naval force, in
this case Task Group 79.3, can move away from its position in the formation it
navigates or stand out from it, without order or authorization from the OCT.
Let us remember that Captain H. Bonzo (OCT )was the Commander of GT 79.3 and at
the same time Commander of C-4.
b. These
fallacious, reckless and ill-intentioned versions lead one to think that the
Destroyers acted as if in flight, every man for himself, without thinking that
what was said tarnished the honor and good name of around 600 comrade crew
members of the escort ships (D -26 and D-29) and frames them in the worst
condition of a soldier, cowardice, flight, abandonment of the fallen
comrade-in-arms.
That being said, let's get on with the facts:
After the battle gong, upon reaching the bridge and taking the OCG guard from the Chief of Electricity, Lieutenant M. Gardiner, I heard that the Commander ordered the Breakdown Central to verify damages, especially checking the magazine and ammunition lockers due to the strong smell of gunpowder already mentioned.
Presuming that we had suffered, in some way, the
detonation or undetonated impact of an enemy torpedo, we attempted to
communicate the news to the OCT (C-4). There was no response. Neither by
radiotelephony, in the tactical circuit (primary radio), nor in the combat
information circuit (secondary radio), nor in the marine VHF (channel 67 and
16). There was an answer from D-29.
Meanwhile, the Combat Information Center (CIC)
already estimated that the C-4 was in shambles (without propulsion), and from
the port wing of the bridge it could already be seen small on the horizon. One
of the signal corporals had reported from the signal bridge, seconds before,
that he had seen 2 or 3 white flares launched from the C-4 that went out
quickly.
I personally looked with binoculars from the port
wing of the bridge and informed the Commander that I found the silhouette of
the cruiser "strange." Sure, it was missing a bow section, but I
didn't realize it at the time. In the subsequent summary, in 1983, I was
expressly questioned on this point several times.
But let us return to the facts.
In the meantime there was an intense exchange of communications between my commander and his counterpart from D-29, Commander Grassi, who was the 2nd. in tactical command (relieving the OCT) and had to assume leadership of GT 79.3
At 021635 MAY 82, D-26 imposed a naval message to
the Commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations (TOAS) VL Lombardo,
the content of which was approximately the following:
"Bouchard reports an unexploded torpedo hit. Belgrano crashed, possibly torpedoed in Lat. 55° 24' S Lon 61°32' ".
Two more messages from D-29 and another from D-26 followed. Among them, one requesting air support from the D-29 as 2nd in Tactical Command.
Although this data is in the war and navigation diaries and final report of the actions, in the General Archive of the Navy, you can easily consult the books: "Hasta la Última Balsa" by Daniel Cavallieri. Institute of Naval Publications. ISBN 978-950-9899-107-2 and/or "One ship, two flags, a thousand battles." Eugenio Facchin ISBN 978-987-28586-0-5.
The operations order issued by Captain Bonzo (CGT 79.3) established in the Rules of Engagement (combat protocols) that if one of its ships was attacked and damaged by the enemy and ,at that time no unit of its own was in contact with the attacking enemy unit, the rest of the ships had to move away from the position until the situation was clarified and then proceed based on the tactical evaluation necessary for the development of future actions and/or operations.
That meant a tremendous pressure, mental and psychological for the Destroyers´Commanders. Comply with the orders previously established by the OCT, as the C-4 Commander himself already said, to move away due to not being in contact with the enemy or ignore them, disobey them, given the possibility of the sinking of the cruiser, the eventual rescue of survivors and a submarine reattack.
Between the approaching sunset and the
deteriorating weather, the C-4 began to disappear from sight, as the ships were
moving away according to the instructions set by the OCT that I already quoted.
Around 1700 radar contact was lost.
Around 1800, commanders were still exchanging clear
communications from the command bridge. Communications that were heard by the author.
Finally around 1815/1830, Commander Grassi (D-29), 2nd in Tactical Command made the decision to return to the Data Point (PD) to investigate the last known position of C-4. I want to state for the record that both Commanders Bárcena and Grassi wanted to go forward in the formation, exposing themselves and their men to risk first. They were friends and classmates and they debated vehemently on the radio, given the intense and dramatic nature of the situation. I was present on the command bridge and witnessed the dialogue.
Finally, seniority prevailed and I remember Commander Grassi when he colloquially told my Commander: " I ´ll go first and if they hit me, you leave." And the D-29 headed towards the site of the sinking.
The D-26 from behind within the range of UHF communications, I don't remember the exact distance, but it was slim, within the horizon.
Meanwhile, the hydrometeorological situation
deteriorated rapidly and the wind reached stormy gusts (more than 60 knots/110
km from the NW), sea state between 6 and 7 (waves of 4 to 9 meters). Visibility
was poor, it was difficult to see due to the prevailing darkness and the sky
was completely covered, the surface temperature was 4°C. The speed of the ships
had to be reduced to a maximum of 6/8 knots, weathering, that is, facing the
waves.
The sea blows damaged the bow sectors. In D-29, the
Artillery Tower No. 1 was left out of service due to structural damage, and in
D-26, some of the bridge glass was cracked and/or stripped .Seawater was
entering it, so we had to cut off the power supply, turn off the radar repeater.
A minimum guard was left in the dark.
As we already had the sad certainty of the sinking, we started thinking about the suffering of the survivors (if there was any)aboard the rafts in the midst of the storm.
Time passed and my memory fails me to specify those hours exactly, but I think I remember that around 2130/2200 news was received:
1. Air support from the Neptune aircraft, from the
Rio Grande Naval Air Base, was not assured and depended on the improvement of
weather conditions.
2. The Abnaki-class fleet ocean tug ARA "Gurruchaga" (A-3), Lieutenant Commander Vasquez and the Polar Vessel ARA "Bahía Paraíso" (B-1), Commander García were heading for support.
After midnight, both ships were still searching,
but the sea state was greater than 7/8, since the waves already reached between
9 and 12 meters. Only eight hours had passed since the torpedoing of the C-4.
At around 0200 on May 3, D-29 was designated by the TOAS Commander as Scene Commander in Action (CEA), that is, responsible for coordinating search and rescue operations at the site. It was also learned that the Neptune 2-P-112 aircraft commanded by Commander Proni Leston had been able to take off from Río Grande despite the bad weather.
Having surpassed the PD (Data Point) , the destroyers reversed course, weathering the storm (receiving waves from the stern), to achieve better stability of the ships and increase the sighting possibilities of the lookouts from the signal bridge and of the free guard personnel who, As best they could due to the bad weather, they collaborated from the outer decks in the visual search. Navigation and deck lights and searchlights were turned on and sirens sounded regularly. It was the end of a discreet and stealthy navigation.
At around 0300, D-29 arrived first at the PD and a short time later D-26 did so without finding any raft or remains in sight. Meanwhile, aircraft 2-P-112, already in the Operations Area (AROP), carried out an expanded square air search pattern originating from the PD (like a spiral of right angles around an origin point).
I must say that aboard , in addition to the anxiety
of not finding the survivors, there was also fatigue, uncertainty and fear (why
not saying it) of the eventual presence
of the enemy submarine. At low speed and with all lights on, we were
undoubtedly an easy target if the submarine had remained there and wished to
attack us.
Around 0500 aircraft 2-P-112 left the AROP and was
replaced by 2-P-111 under the command of Lieutenant Commander Pérez Roca. The
low ceiling (height of low clouds) forced the air unit to search at a very low
altitude, not ideal in terms of optimal visual and radar sweep width (what it
can see or detect laterally). Meanwhile the destroyers continued a random
search of the PD.
At 0830, with the sun already on the horizon, D-29 and D-26 began a parallel leg surface search with 2000 yards of separation between ships, as visibility was still poor, heading SE, according to the drift. calculated from the ponds by the wind-current effect recorded since 1600 the previous day. This separation between ships was later increased, as visibility improved. The fleet ocean tug ARA Gurruchaga (A-3) was already nearby, to collaborate as well.
At approximately 0900, emergency radio broadcasts
were heard with requests for help from the raft crew members, but with very
inaccurate positions ;almost impossible for it to be real. However, A-3 was
assigned to investigate. But, beyond that, we celebrated loudly, we were all
energized, well... There were survivors, we didn't know how many, but there
were!!!
Shortly after 0900, aircraft 2-P-111 sighted an oil slick about 300 meters wide, extending in a SE (Southeast) direction and began a new expanded square aerial search. D-26 and D-29 headed there, and then A-3.
In the meantime, the aircraft's radar detected an intermittent contact, compatible with a submarine periscope. It launched passive sononobuoys and heard a slight, very low hydrophonic rumble, which could not be properly classified other than as a possible submarine .That is a low confidence POSSUB (unlikely that was a submarine, but cannot be ruled out ). He performed a contact confirmation tactic with the MAD magnetic sensor (magnetic air detector), called the MAD cloverleaf trap, with negative results. (The MAD is a sensor that detects alterations in the normal Earth's magnetic field, in the presence of a ferrous object, such as a submarine).
The destroyer commanders exchanged intense communications again. They had a great tactical doubt regarding the possibility of enemy submarine presence again. The same psychological and mental pressure as before. It was decided that the search would be followed only by the auxiliary ship A-3 and the combat units, they would go into anti-submarine combat (AS) configuration and change the mission of the aircraft also to AS or continue the search for the rafts and survivors. From such talk, from that excited conversation between classmates, came the decision. Continue as up to that point. Search for rafts and survivors and let it happen whatever God ordered.
2-P-111, already at the limit of its autonomy, and having been authorized to withdraw from the AROP by the D-29 that carried out air control, decided, after consulting with its crew and a new authorization from the CEA, to return and make a final search for parallel legs, on the most extreme calculated trajectory of the rafts drift.
The plane had already exceeded the limit of its fuel range. He only had a small margin left to return to his base without falling into the sea first. They sighted a floating drum first and at 1320, on May 3, the raft field was sighted. Almost 50 nautical miles from the PD and, 20 hours after the sinking , they finally appeared...!!!
The destroyers and the warning were just over 20 nautical
miles from that position and we all went there at maximum speed. That was the
end of the search operation.
In images, the rescue of the survivors.
Glory and Honor to the fallen. Recognition of the
survivors of the ARA Cruise "General Belgrano".
AUTHOR'S READING SUGGESTIONS:
1. Hasta la última balsa, Daniel Cavalieri, Editorial: Instituto de Publicaciones
Navales, Ed. 2011. ISBN 978 950 899 107 2.
2. Un buque, dos banderas, mil combates, Eugenio L. Facchin, Editorial: Asociación Civil
Homenaje al destructor Bouchard. Ed. 2012.
ISBN 978 987 28586 0 5.
3. Destructor ARA Bouchard en Malvinas. Washington Bárcena. Editorial: Argentinidad. Ed. 2022.
ISBN 978 987 8934 03 7.
4. Ataquen Río Grande. Jorge Muñoz. Editorial: Instituto de Publicaciones
Navales. Ed. 2008 ISBN 978 950 899 051 1.
5. Tres andandas en la oscuridad. Jorge G. Olarte. Editorial: Prosa Editores. Ed. 2017.
ISBN 978 987 729 296 1.
6. The untold story of a fighting ship. Eugenio L. Facchin. Editorial: Springer.
(springer.com). Ed. 2022). ISBN 978 3 030 926623 6 e ISBN 978 3 030 92624 3
(eBook).
In 1973, Captain VGM (R) Rafael Rey Álvarez entered, the Navy´s “Admiral Brown” Naval Military High School . He graduated from the Naval Military School in 1980 as a member of Class 109. He trained as a Surface Officer, and specialized in underwater weapons. He served on various ships of the Sea Fleet, such as destroyers, corvettes, fleet ocean tugs and mine sweepers. Likewise, he served on the Fleet General Staff on two occasions. He was part of the Naval Aviation as Staff of the 2nd Naval Air Helicopter Squadron. He participated in Antarctic campaigns aboard icebreakers and the polar ship.
He served as a United Nations (UN) Military
Observer in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1994. He was Chief of Studies of the frigate
ARA Libertad in 2000. He served as Liaison Officer to the Fleet Forces Command
the US Navy in the years 2003 and 2004. Rey Alvarez commanded the hydrographic
vessel ARA Comodoro Rivadavia,
oceanographic vessel ARA Puerto Deseado and served in the Naval
Transports´ Command.
Rey Alvarez attended the Naval War School and the
Higher Course of the Armed Forces on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1982, during
the war of Malvinas, served as Chief of Navigation aboard the destroyer ARA
Bouchard.
For this, he was decorated by the Congress of the
Argentine Nation and distinguished by the Navy with the “Combat Operations”
badge. He also received decorations from the UN and USN for services rendered.
Note:
The ARA Bouchard (D-26) was a destroyer incorporated into the Argentine Navy in 1972. She took its name from Hipólito Bouchard, a navy officer who carried out naval campaigns for Argentina between 1817-1819. She was transferred from the United States Navy, where she had served as USS Borie (DD-704), until that year from 1944. USS Borie (DD-704) was one of 58 Allen M. Sumner Class destroyers built for the United States Navy. It was the second ship named after Adolph E. Borie, President Ulysses S. Grant's Secretary of the Navy. The USS Borie was built by the Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, which laid down the hull on February 29, 1944 followed by launching on July 4 of the same year. The new destroyer was commissioned by the United States Navy on September 21, 1944. The Borie displaced 2,200 tons with standard load and up to 3,320 tons with full load. It had a length of 114.8 meters, a beam of 12.5 m and a draft of 5.8 m.
